Please forward principles of dynamics greenwood pdf free download error screen to sharedip-1666228125. It claims that our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities to interact with the world.
Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science. The term ‘enactivism’ is close in meaning to ‘enaction’, defined as “the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation”. In the enactive view, knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with its environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. The self arises as part of the process of an embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways determined by its physiology.
In this sense, individuals can be seen to “grow into” or arise from their interactive role with the world. Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. Organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act. The problem with the dualistic concepts of consciousness and life in standard formulations of the hard problem is that they exclude each other by construction”. In this interpretation, enactivism asserts that science is formed or enacted as part of humankind’s interactivity with its world, and by embracing phenomenology “science itself is properly situated in relation to the rest of human life and is thereby secured on a sounder footing.
However, ‘constructivism’ focuses upon more than a simple ‘interactivity’ that could be described as a minor adjustment to ‘assimilate’ reality or ‘accommodate’ to it. Learning is a result of perceived anomalies that produce dissatisfaction with existing conceptions. How does constructivism relate to enactivism? Inasmuch as an organism must reflect its environment well enough for the organism to be able to survive in it, and to be competitive enough to be able to reproduce at sustainable rate, the structure and reflexes of the organism itself embody knowledge of its environment. Embodied theories are also no longer expressed in language, but in anatomical structures or reflex responses, etc. In the enactive view, perception “is not conceived as the transmission of information but more as an exploration of the world by various means. Cognition is not tied into the workings of an ‘inner mind’, some cognitive core, but occurs in directed interaction between the body and the world it inhabits.
These arise from our agent-active ‘movements and interaction’ with objects, or ‘object-active’ changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object’s appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us. Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach. In a more general criticism, Clark suggests that perception is not a matter of expectations about sensorimotor mechanisms guiding perception. Another application of enaction to perception is analysis of the human hand.
The many remarkably demanding uses of the hand are not learned by instruction, but through a history of engagements that lead to the acquisition of skills. According to one interpretation, it is suggested that “the hand an organ of cognition”, not a faithful subordinate working under top-down instruction, but a partner in a “bi-directional interplay between manual and brain activity. Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others – including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience – are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and content-free. The idea takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter.
This allows them to define social cognition as the generation of meaning and its transformation through interacting individuals. In a similar vein, “an inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behavior of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself”. Torrance adds that “many kinds of agency, in particular the agency of human beings, cannot be understood separately from understanding the nature of the interaction that occurs between agents. That view introduces the social applications of enactivism. Baerveldt and Verheggen argue that “It appears that seemingly natural experience is thoroughly intertwined with sociocultural realities. They suggest that the social patterning of experience is to be understood through enactivism, “the idea that the reality we have in common, and in which we find ourselves, is neither a world that exists independently from us, nor a socially shared way of representing such a pregiven world, but a world itself brought forth by our ways of communicating and our joint action.