Boston’s two major train terminals. 22 billion, including interest, and that it would not 700 opening traps pdf paid off until 2038. While traffic moved somewhat better, the other problems remained.
75,000 vehicles a day, but by the 1990s, this had grown to 190,000 vehicles a day. Traffic jams of 16 hours were predicted for 2010. The expressway had tight turns, an excessive number of entrances and exits, entrance ramps without merge lanes, and as the decades passed, had continually escalating vehicular traffic that was well beyond its design capacity. Charles River under construction, looking north.
The old elevated Central Artery crossing is to the right. Another important motivation for the final form of the Big Dig was the abandonment of the Massachusetts Department of Public Works’ intended expressway system through and around Boston. The Central Artery, as part of Mass. Inner Belt and the Boston section of I-95. Boston’s youngest and southernmost neighborhood. In 1974, the remainder of the Master Plan was canceled, leaving Boston with a severely overstressed expressway system for the existing traffic. With ever-increasing traffic volumes funneled onto I-93 alone, the Central Artery became chronically gridlocked.
Parts of the planned I-695 right-of-way remain unused and under consideration for future mass-transit projects. Central Artery to reach these tunnels. Getting between the Central Artery and the tunnels involved short diversions onto city streets, increasing local congestion. The expressway separated downtown from the waterfront, and was increasingly choked with bumper-to-bumper traffic. Planning for the Big Dig as a project officially began in 1982, with environmental impact studies starting in 1983. Eventually, MTA combined some of its employees with joint venture employees in an integrated project organization.